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Abstract 
 
I discuss three recent counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding due to Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that 
the counterexamples don’t work and draw some conclusions about the relationship between grounding and 
explanation. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Metaphysical grounding is a hot topic. While there is significant disagreement on 
particulars1  there has been broad agreement that grounding is irreflexive, asymmetric and 
reflexive.2  Recently, however, Schaffer (2012) has proposed three counterexamples to the 
thesis that (partial) grounding is transitive. None of these counterexamples withstand 
scrutiny—or so I’ll argue. 
 
My goal isn’t just to swat down the counterexamples; nor is the point just to show that there 
is some transitive relation of grounding. 3  The main moral of my resolution of the 
counterexamples is that grounding corresponds to (metaphysical) “explanation how” in the 
following sense: when ϕ is grounded in ψ then ψ is a way for it to be the case that ϕ. If we 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., the essays collected in Correia and Schnieder, 2012. 
 
2 Though see Jenkins, 2011. 
 
3 That is trivial: take transitive closures. 
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understand grounding in this way it’s possible to prove that grounding is transitive (see 
section 3).4 
 
2.  The Notion of Ground 
I take grounding to be metaphysical explanation: to say that ϕ grounds ψ is to say that ϕ 
provides a metaphysical explanation of ψ. What’s in question is constitutive explanation: if 
ψ grounds ϕ then its being the case that ϕ consists in its being the case that ψ. This is the 
notion of grounding brought to prominence by Fine (2001, 2012a,b) and it’s the notion of 
grounding that Schaffer takes not to be transitive.5  I’ll adopt Fine’s notation and use “∆ < 
ϕ” to state that ∆ fully grounds ϕ.6  This relation of ground is plural on the left: ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . 
can jointly ground ψ. In what follows I’ll use ∆, Γ, . . . for sets of facts and ϕ0, ϕ1 , . . . , ψ0, 
ψ1, . . . for individual facts. 
 
The grounding is full in the sense that if ∆ < ϕ, then ∆ provides a complete explanation of ϕ; 
nothing need be added to ∆ in order to have a complete explanation of ϕ. This notion is 
taken to be transitive in the sense that it satisfies Cut: 
 
∆0< ϕ0     ∆1< ϕ1   . . .  ϕ0 , ϕ1 , . . . , Γ < ϕ  Cut 
               ∆0, ∆1 , . . . , Γ< ϕ 
 
We say that ϕ is a partial  ground of ψ (ϕ ≺ ψ) iff there are some further facts ϕ0 , ϕ1, . . . 
such that ϕ, ϕ0 , ϕ1, . . .< ψ.7  Schaffer’s counterexamples are directed at the transitivity of 
                                                 
4 (Raven, forthcoming) has also recently taken these counterexamples (and other “non-orthodox” views on 
ground) to task. As we’ll see, I take issue with his treatment of two of the counterexamples—see footnotes 15 
and 19. 
 
5 In this paper I follow Schaffer in taking grounding to be a relation between facts (or states-of-affairs). My 
own preference is to treat grounding as a sentential operator—as in (Fine, 2012b). For what it’s worth I think 
the counterexamples are easier to deal with when grounding is treated by means of a sentential operator. 
 
6 This is Fine’s notation for strict (i.e., asymmetric) full ground, but none of the counterexamples turn on 
strictness (though see footnote 17). (For more on these notions see Fine, 2012a,b). 
 
7 The differences between the different notions of partial ground in (Fine, 2012b) do not matter here. 
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strict partial ground, but since Cut for < entails that ≺ is transitive they would also be 
counterexamples  to Cut.8 
 
Grounding is usually taken to be non-monotonic: if ∆ < ϕ it doesn’t follow that ∆, ψ < ϕ. 
This might be explained as follows. Since grounding is a form of explanation the grounds 
for ϕ all have to be relevant to ϕ. For instance, its raining grounds the fact that it’s raining or 
snowing, but the facts that it is raining and that it is overcast in Oslo don’t ground the fact 
that it’s raining or snowing—the fact that it is overcast in Oslo has nothing to do with the 
fact that it is raining or snowing. 
 
Crucially, this doesn’t mean that one cannot add some ψ to ∆ and still have a satisfactory 
explanation of ϕ. Even if ∆ provides a complete explanation of ϕ, ψ might still relevant to 
explaining ϕ. For an example: suppose both ϕ and ψ are the case. Then ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ) is 
grounded both in ϕ alone and in ϕ, ψ taken together.9  This example is noteworthy also 
because it shows that strict partial grounds aren’t necessary conditions for what they 
ground. Even if ψ hadn’t been the case ϕ ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ) would have been the case (as long as ϕ is 
still the case). 
 
3.  The Dented Sphere 
 
Schaffer’s counterexamples turn on trying to show that relevance isn’t preserved across 
chains of grounding.  The first counterexample goes as follows.10 Imagine a slightly dented 
sphere—a say. a has a fully determinate shape—S , let’s say. a also has a determinable 
shape—let’s say it’s more-or-less spherical. Consider now the following partial grounding 
claims. 
 
(1) The fact that a has the particular dent it does grounds the fact that a has shape S.11 
                                                 
8 Thanks to Paul Hovda for helping me see that on an earlier formulation of Cut, Cut wouldn’t entail the 
transitivity of ≺. 
 
9  The principle of “Amalgamation” of (Fine, 2012b) ensures that this happens often. If the ∆i taken 
individually strictly fully grounds ϕ, then the ∆i taken collectively strictly fully ground ϕ. 
 
10 This counterexample is also endorsed by (Trogdon, forthcoming). 
 
11 Schaffer uses “has a dent” instead of “has the particular dent it does”. But the grounding claim “The fact 
that a has a dent grounds the fact that a has shape S ” is surely false. What grounds a’s having shape S is not 
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(2) The fact that a has shape S grounds the fact that a is more-or-less spherical. 
 
These claims both seem acceptable. Transitivity would give us: 
 
(3) The fact that a has the particular dent it does grounds the fact that a is more-or-less 
spherical. 
 
Schaffer doesn’t approve. 
 
(3) is implausible, since the presence of the dent makes no difference to the more-or-
less sphericality of the thing. The thing would be more-or-less spherical either way. 
The presence of the dent in no way helps to support the more-or-less sphericality of 
the thing, but is if anything a threat to the more-or-less sphericality of the thing. The 
thing is more-or-less spherical despite the minor dent, not because of it. (Schaffer, 
2012) 
 
It’s easy to see how this gives rise to a counterexample to Cut. For consider the relationship 
between these partial grounding claims and the full grounding claims that witness them. 
Without loss of generality we may assume that what underlies the partial grounding claim 
(1) is the following full grounding claim: 
 
(1’)   The fact that a has the particular dent it has together with the fact that a is elsewhere 
         shaped like S’ fully  grounds that it has shape S 
 
Since (2) is already a full grounding claim, Cut now gives us: 
 
   (3’) The fact that a has the particular dent it has together with the fact that a is elsewhere 
            shaped like S’ grounds that it is more-or-less spherical. 
While I can hear (3) as somewhat problematic, (3’) seems completely unproblematic.  I 
don’t see how a’s having the particular dent it actually has “makes no difference” to a’s 
being more-or-less spherical: in this case a’s being more-or-less spherical just consists in its 
having the particular dent it does together with its being shaped like S’ elsewhere. Since (3) 
                                                                                                                                                     
a’s having some-or-other dent—even one exactly like the one it in fact has—but rather its having the 
particular (type of) dent it has. We have to distinguish between claims of the forms “(∃xϕ) < ψ” and “∃x(ϕ < 
ψ)”.  Alternatively put, when grounding is at issue we have to distinguish between the property of having a 
dent and the property of being dented. 
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follows immediately from (3’) by the definition of partial ground (3) has to be 
unproblematic too. 
 
We might grant Schaffer that it’s true that a would have been spherical even without the 
presence of the dent. We might even grant him the modal claim that the shape S’ is such 
that, necessarily, if a has shape S’, then a’s having shape S’ grounds a’s being more or less 
spherical. But this doesn’t mean that a’s having the particular dent it in fact has doesn’t 
contribute to actually making S more-or-less spherical. For a actually has shape S and 
having shape S consists, in part, in having the (type of) dent a actually has. As we noted 
above the strict partial grounds for ϕ don’t have to be necessary for ϕ; in particular, ψ can be 
a strict partial ground for ϕ even though ϕ is strictly fully grounded in ∆ and ψ isn’t amongst 
the ∆. 
 
Even though it fails this counterexample is valuable because it tells us something about the 
type of explanation grounding is associated with. We can grant Schaffer that a’s having the 
particular dent it in fact has makes no difference to whether the state-of-affairs of a’s being 
more-or-less spherical obtains or not. But it doesn’t follow from this that a’s having the 
particular dent it has makes no difference to the obtaining of the state-of-affairs of a’s being 
more-or-less spherical: it makes a difference to how it obtains. a’s having the particular dent 
it does is part of the way in which a is more-or-less spherical. While the grounds for ϕ 
explain ϕ, what is to be explained is not why ϕ is the case (as opposed  to not the case); 
rather, what is to be explained is how it is the case that ϕ. That question is answered by 
specifying (part of) a way in which it is the case that ϕ. 
 
It’s not terribly important to reserve the name “grounding” for the type of explanation-how 
sketched above; in particular, it’s not important to deny the name “grounding” to the non-
transitive relation Schaffer is interested in studying. What is important is that (a) this notion 
of explanation has a reasonable claim to be labeled grounding; and (b) that the transitivity of 
this type of explanation isn’t just a result of taking the transitive closure. 
 
A case can be made for both these claims.  For one might think that grounding and the 
notion of a way for a state of affairs to obtain are intimately related in the following way. 
 
LINKAGE: ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . < ϕ iff (1) any ways for ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . to obtain collectively constitutive  
                  a way for ϕ to obtain; and (2) it’s not the case that there are some θ0, θ1, . . . such 
                  that any ways for θ0, θ1, . . . , ϕ to obtain collectively constitute a way for ϕi  to 
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                  obtain, for some i.12 
 
If (LINKAGE) is correct Cut immediately follows. 
 
To take a representative case: suppose ψ0, ψ1 , . . . , ϕ < ψ and ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . < ϕ. So let v0, v1, . 
. . be some ways for ψ0, ψ1, . . . to obtain and let w0, w1, . . . be some ways for ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . to 
obtain. Since ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . < ϕ, w0, w1, . . . collectively constitute a way for ϕ to be the case. 
But then it follows by ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ϕ < ψ that v0, v1 . . . , w0, w1, . . . collectively constitutive 
a way for ψ to be the case. 
 
Next suppose that there are some θ0, θ1, . . . such that any ways for θ0, θ1, . . . , ψ to obtain 
collectively constitute a way for some σ ∈ ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ψ0, ψ1, . . . to be the case. If σ is ψi  
for some i we contradict ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ϕ < ψ (by the second clause of (LINKAGE)). So 
suppose σ is ϕi , for some i. But then it follows by similar reasoning  as above that any ways 
for ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ϕ, θ0, θ1, . . . to be the case is a way for ϕi  to be the case. But this contradicts 
that ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ϕ < ψ (again by the second clause of (LINKAGE)). 
 
The idea that the grounds for ϕ are the ways for ϕ to be the case can be made surprisingly 
precise. A similar idea forms the basis for the semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground (Fine, 
2012b) and also for the semantics for counterfactual conditionals in (Fine, forthcoming).13 
 
This talk of ways for a state of affairs to obtain—or: different obtainings of a state-of-
affairs—can  be taken in two quite different ways. First, we can take the way in which a 
state-of-affairs F obtains to be an entity distinct from the state-of-affairs F.14  Second, we 
can take such talk to be cashed out in terms of explanation-how. If we do the former, one 
could argue that we don’t need explanation-how as a distinct form of explanation: when its 
being the case that ϕ grounds its being the case that ψ, what is explained is why the 
particular obtaining of ψ exists (rather than not). 
 
                                                 
12 The latter clause is necessary to ensure the asymmetry of grounding. 
 
13 Indeed, for those familiar with the Pure Logic of Ground the above argument for Cut should look familiar. It 
essentially replicates the proof that Cut is valid with respect to the semantics presented in (Fine, 2012b). 
 
14 One might say that the obtaining of a state-of-affairs stands to the state of affairs as a particularized property 
(trope) stands to the property. 
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My preference is to take the notion of explaining-how as primitive. This view is very 
natural if one treats grounding as a sentential operator: for instance, it makes it much easier 
to say that a (contingent) disjunction could be grounded in a different disjunct than the one 
in which it in fact is grounded. In the remainder of the paper my talk of “obtainings” is 
officially to be read in this way. For the purposes of blocking Schaffer’s counterexamples, 
however, we don’t have to choose between the two readings: they don’t threaten the idea 
that grounding as a relation between obtainings is transitive. 
 
If the above considerations are correct the next two counterexamples are spurious. There is 
nevertheless much to be learned by trying to understand exactly what goes wrong in those 
counterexamples. 
 
4.  The Third Member 
 
In the next counterexample, Schaffer asks us to consider a set S with three distinct members 
a, b, c. He then endorses the following claims: 
 
(4) The fact that c is a member of S grounds the fact that S has exactly three members. 
 
(5) The fact that S has exactly three members grounds the fact that S has finitely many 
members. 
 
Transitivity now yields: 
 
(6) The fact that c is a member of S grounds the fact that S has finitely many members. 
 
Schaffer doesn’t like this: 
 
(6) is implausible, since c’s being a member of S in no way helps contribute  to the 
fact that S  is finite.   S would be finite  either way, with or without  c as a member. 
If anything, S remains finite not because of but despite taking on c as an additional 
member. (Schaffer, 2012) 
 
One might worry that since sets have their members essentially we cannot make sense of the 
supposition that S doesn’t have c as a member; if that’s right Schaffer’s reasoning wouldn’t 
even make any sense. This worry  is easily circumvented, however: instead of considering 
the set S just consider a property  that contingently is only instantiated by a, b, c but could 
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have been instantiated by only a, b. For simplicity I’ll continue working  with Schaffer’s 
example. 
 
Here the resolution lies in distinguishing two notions of finitude.15 
 
EXACT FINITUDE:  For S to be finite is for S to have 0 members or for S to have exactly 1  
             member or for S to have exactly 2 members or . . . 
 
INEXACT FINITUDE:  For S to be finite is for S to have 0 members or for S to have at most 
1 member or for S to have at most 2 members or . . . 
 
These two alternatives are indeed (classically) equivalent.  Now, classical equivalence does 
not entail that one has all and only the same grounds. For instance, the sentence “it’s raining 
or not raining” is classically equivalent to “it’s snowing or not snowing”. But while the fact 
that it is raining does ground that it is raining or not raining it does not ground that it is 
snowing or not snowing. 
 
And so it is here, too: (Inexact Finitude) differs from (Exact Finitude) in terms of 
grounding.  If we take finitude  to be defined by (Exact Finitude) then (5) is acceptable, but 
then so is (6).  On the other hand, if we take finitude to be defined as in (Inexact Finitude), 
then while (6) indeed isn’t acceptable, neither is (5). It might be instructive to see why (5) is 
false if we take “finitude” in this way. 
 
To show that (5) is false when “finitude” is interpreted as inexact finitude I will assume the 
transitivity of grounding. This is dialectically acceptable: the goal now is not to convince 
                                                 
15 (Raven, forthcoming) takes the problem to be that the set’s “having exactly three members has nothing to do 
with which members it has, only with how many members it has. How many members it has needn’t depend 
upon any particular member of it.  For example, that set {a, b, c} has exactly three members might be 
grounded in its being one-one mappable to some or other three-membered set.” This seems a very implausible 
account of what grounds that a set S has exactly three members. The claim that {a, b, c} has exactly three 
members is now grounded in the existence of a bijection and the existence of some or other exactly three-
membered set S’. But the existence of a three-membered set is surely grounded in the existence of its 
members. Let d be an arbitrary object. Then the existence of d partially grounds that S has three members! For 
d is a member of a three-membered set S’, so the existence of d partially grounds the existence of S’, and the 
existence of S’ partially grounds that {a, b, c} is exactly three-membered. But then, by the transitivity of 
grounding, the existence of d partially grounds that {a, b, c} has exactly three members! It is possible to 
circumvent this problem by treating “mappable” in a modal fashion, but the present solution is neater. 
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the skeptic that grounding is transitive; the point is just to give an explanation for why (5) is 
false. 
 
Let’s first note that if S’s having exactly three members were to ground that S is inexactly 
finite, then this would have to be by grounding that S has at most n members for some n.  (A 
ground for a disjunction passes through a disjunct.)  Now, the claim that S has exactly three 
members is partly grounded in the fact that c ∈ S . By the transitivity of grounding, then, the 
fact that c ∈ S is a partial ground for the fact that S has at most n members. Without loss of 
generality, let’s assume that n = 3. 
 
The claim that S has at most three members is the following claim.16 
 
(1)                              ∃xyz(∀v(v ∉ S ∨ v = x ∨ v = y ∨ x = z) 
 
A ground for an existential generalization is a ground for one of the true instances. 
Instantiating with a, b, c we get 
 
(2)                               ∀v(v ∉ S ∨ v = a ∨ v = b ∨ x = c) 
 
We then get that c ∈ S has to ground (2). 
 
What grounds a universal generalization ∀xϕ?  I follow (Fine, 2012a) in holding that the 
immediate grounds are the instances ϕ(a), ϕ(b), ϕ(c) . . .together with the fact T (a, b, c, . . . ) 
that a, b, c . . . are all and only the objects there are.  If the fact c ∈ S grounds (2) it does so 
by grounding  one of the immediate grounds for (2). (Grounds for ∀xϕ are filtered through 
the immediate grounds for ∀xϕ.) How could that be? 
 
Presumably the fact that c ∈ S doesn’t contribute to grounding the fact that a, b, c, . . . are 
all and only the objects there are. (c’s existing helps ground the fact that a, b, c . . . are all 
and only the objects there, but c’s being a member of S would seem to play no role.)  
 
So if c ∈ S is to ground (2) it can only be by grounding one of the instances. Such an 
instance is of the form 
 
                                                 
16 I write this out in terms of conjunction, disjunction and negation. Nobody knows how to deal with grounds 
for (bi)conditionals. 
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(3)                                d ∉ S ∨ d = a ∨ d = b ∨ d = c 
 
Clearly, the fact that c ∈ S has nothing to do with the truth of any of these disjuncts. The 
fact that c ∈ S is irrelevant to the identity-claims17 and that c ∈ S is clearly irrelevant to the 
fact that d ∉ S. 
 
5.  The Cat’s Meow 
 
It’s usually accepted that an existentially quantified truth is grounded in its true instances.18  
It’s a virtue of Schaffer’s last counterexample that it forces us to think hard about what this 
actually means. 
 
Imagine that Cadmus the cat is meowing and suppose that origin essentialism is true 
(Kripke, 1980). Then Schaffer thinks we should accept 
 
(7) The fact that the creature was produced from the meeting of this sperm and that 
ovum grounds the fact that Cadmus is meowing. 
 
(8) The fact that Cadmus is meowing grounds the fact that something is meowing. 
 
Transitivity would now give us 
 
(9) The fact that the creature was produced from the meeting of this sperm and that 
ovum grounds the fact that something is meowing. 
 
Schaffer objects: 
 
the present extrinsic and historical fact that the creature was produced from the 
meeting of this sperm and that ovum (as opposed to some other sperm-and-ovum 
duo) makes no difference to the creature’s present intrinsic physical state, which is 
                                                 
17 The only potential counterexample is if a = d = S . For one might hold that the identity of a set is grounded 
in the identities of its members and the fact that they are its members. The problem is that if a = d = S , then a 
is a self-membered set, and in the case of self-membered sets the principle that the identity of a set is grounded 
in the identities of its members and the fact that they are its members is deeply problematic.  For if a ∈ a, this 
principle gives us that a = a is a partial ground for a = a, contradicting the asymmetry of grounding. 
 
18 Though one should be wary of the problems of (Fine, 2010). 
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what is crucial to its ability to witness the existence generalization that something is 
meowing.  Whether the creature counts as Cadmus or some other cat, it is meowing 
all the same. The fact that the creature was produced from the meeting of this sperm 
and that ovum helps make it be Cadmus meowing, but doesn’t help make it be 
Cadmus meowing. (Schaffer, 2012) 
 
One thing we could do here is just to deny (7).19  And there is something right about this. 
After all, the creature in question just is Cadmus (not just “counts as Cadmus”). What does 
the fact that Cadmus derived from this sperm and that ovum have to do with the fact that he 
is meowing? Whether he meows only turns on whether he is, well, meowing; it doesn’t turn 
on how he originated.  Facts about what something essentially is needn’t be parts of the 
grounds for how that thing is. 
 
This is right as far as it goes but that’s not as far as the heart of the counterexample. In 
general, one might think that facts involving certain “complex” individuals ultimately are 
grounded in facts not involving those very individuals. In this particular example, we may 
consider the matter which constitutes Cadmus and we might  want to say that it’s partly  in 
virtue of this matter’s having such-and-such a causal history that Cadmus is meowing.20  
Making the appropriate changes throughout we can recreate Schaffer’s counterexample. For 
simplicity I will therefore continue to work with Schaffer’s formulation. 
Where, then, is the problem? Schaffer’s crucial move is in the line: 
 
makes no difference to the creature’s present intrinsic physical state, which is what 
is crucial to its ability to witness the existence generalization that something is 
meowing. 
 
This is not correct. While the only features of Cadmus that are relevant to his meowing are 
his intrinsic features, it is still Cadmus that is doing the meowing and when there is 
                                                 
19 This is the line taken in (Raven, forthcoming). 
 
20 (Raven, forthcoming) considers and rejects—correctly in my view—a superficially similar view.  The view 
in question is that what differentiates the fact that Cadmus is meowing from the (let’s assume) qualitatively 
identical fact that Tibbles is meowing is that Cadmus has a certain essential property and that Tibbles has a 
different essential property. The present idea differs from this along two lines. First, we consider a property of 
the matter which constitutes Cadmus and not a property of Cadmus himself. Second, the property is not an 
essential property of the matter. 
 
Essays Philos (2013) 14:1                                                                                                               Litland | 30 
 
 
 
 
something that is meowing there is some particular something that is meowing. The 
particular doing the meowing here is Cadmus. 
 
To see this, distinguish between there being meowing and there being something that 
meows.21  What has to be grounded is not just that there is meowing, what has to be 
grounded is that there is a particular something or other that is meowing. And while I 
would agree that the fact that it is Cadmus that is meowing is irrelevant to explaining the 
fact that there is meowing the fact that it is Cadmus that is meowing is relevant to 
explaining that there is a particular something or other that is meowing. 
 
It might help to put the point like this.  The intrinsic state, S, of the creature is such that, 
necessarily, for all b, if b is in intrinsic state S then b’s being in intrinsic state S grounds  
there being something that meows. In this sense the intrinsic state of the creature is all that 
matters to witnessing the existential generalization. But this hardly shows that Cadmus is 
irrelevant: in the actual world it is Cadmus that is in the relevant intrinsic state. The intrinsic 
state is the state of something—Cadmus in this case. While it is true that anything that fills 
the role—is in the relevant intrinsic state—will do equally well, we shouldn’t conclude from 
this that what fills the role is explanatorily irrelevant. 
 
Putting it in the terms of the section 3, we can grant Schaffer that while its being Cadmus 
that is meowing makes no difference to whether the state-of-affairs that somebody is 
meowing obtains, Cadmus’s meowing nevertheless makes a difference to the obtaining of 
the state-of-affairs that something is meowing. Cadmus’ meowing is the way in which the 
state-of-affairs that there is somebody who is meowing obtains. 
 
Above I’ve assumed that the only thing that meows is Cadmus and one could deny this. One 
could, e.g., say that Cadmus differs from the mereological sum of the atoms that are parts of 
Cadmus and that both the mereological sum and Cadmus meows. Or one could say—
because of the Problem of the Many (see e.g., Weatherson, 2009)—that there are several 
distinct (though almost identical) meowing cats present. This does not help. For if Cadmus 
isn’t the only thing meowing then he is still one of the things meowing and so still 
contributes to making it the case that there is a particular something or other that is 
                                                 
21 Or distinguish  between the truth  of “meoweth” and the truth  of “there is something that meows” (cf Quine, 
1960). 
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meowing. The causal history of the matter constituting him is therefore still part of the way 
in which the state-of-affairs that there is something in particular that is meowing obtains. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
If (LINKAGE) is correct there cannot be any counterexamples to the transitivity of 
grounding. I’ll hazard the guess that putative counterexamples to the transitivity of 
grounding only show that some subtle distinction has been overlooked. In helping elicit 
such distinctions Schaffer’s examples are exemplary; may future ones prove equally 
instructive. 
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